Fewer Peacekeepers, More Wars Between States

MER/26/B01 · Brief · Meridian Research Team · 27 October 2026

In 2025 the number of conflicts between states reached its highest level since 1946, while the number of personnel in multilateral peace operations fell to its lowest December level since at least 2000. This brief sets the two trends side by side and asks what the widening gap means for conflict management.

Key points

• UCDP data record eight interstate conflicts in 2025, up from two in 2023, the highest annual figure in its records going back to 1946 [1; 2].
• Fatalities in organised violence rose to 244,600 in 2025, the second-highest total since 1994 [1].
• At the end of 2025, 78,633 international personnel served in multilateral peace operations, 49% fewer than in December 2016 [3, p. 1].
• In July 2025 UN peacekeeping faced a US$2 billion shortfall, more than 35% of its 2024–25 budget [3, p. 3].
• The UN's 2026 regular budget of US$3.45 billion reflects a 15% reduction in financial resources and a cut of nearly 19% in staffing [4].

1. The problem

Two of the most widely used datasets on international security point in opposite directions. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) shows armed conflict between states rising sharply. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows the number of personnel in multilateral peace operations, a main instrument of collective conflict management, falling steeply. This brief examines the evidence for each trend and the policy implications of the gap between them.

2. Conflict: more states at war

According to UCDP, interstate conflicts doubled for the second consecutive year in 2025, to eight [1]. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 26.1) records two interstate conflicts in 2023, four in 2024 and eight in 2025, more than in any earlier year since 1946 [2]. They include the conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, Iran and Israel, India and Pakistan, and Israel and Syria [2].

The broader picture is similar. The number of state-based conflicts, in which at least one party is the government of a state, reached a record 65 [1; 2]. Thirteen of them reached the level of war, meaning at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in the year [2; 5]. That matches 2014 and is the highest number since 1992 [2].

Lethality rose too. Fatalities in organised violence increased from about 187,000 in 2024 to 244,600 in 2025, the second-highest total since the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, surpassed only by 2022 [1]. The war between Russia and Ukraine was the deadliest conflict, with about 94,700 battle-related deaths in UCDP's best estimate, roughly 62% of the 153,600 state-based battle deaths recorded worldwide [1; 6]. The conflict between Israel and Hamas and allied groups, and the conflict in Sudan, were the next deadliest [6].

Violence against civilians increased most dramatically. One-sided violence rose fivefold, from 14,300 deaths in 2024 to 76,500 in 2025. UCDP attributes this mainly to large-scale violence against civilians in Sudan, which pushed fatalities to their highest level since 1994 [1].

One trend ran the other way. Non-state violence, fighting between groups none of which is a government, fell to its lowest level since 2013 [1], with about 14,500 deaths in 2025 [7].

3. Conflict management: fewer people, less money

SIPRI's fact sheet Developments and Trends in Multilateral Peace Operations, 2025 describes the reverse movement. The 78,633 personnel deployed in December 2025 were 17% fewer than a year earlier and 49% fewer than in December 2016. It was the lowest December total since at least 2000 [3, p. 1].

There were 58 multilateral peace operations active in 34 countries or territories in 2025, three fewer than in 2024. Europe and sub-Saharan Africa each hosted 18, the Middle East and North Africa 14, the Americas 5 and Asia 3 [3, p. 1]. Sub-Saharan Africa, which saw the biggest personnel cuts, hosted 70% of peace-operation personnel [3, p. 1].

Funding is a central constraint. SIPRI finds that the personnel cuts of 2025 were largely driven by a liquidity crisis at the UN caused by delayed or unpaid contributions from major donors [3, p. 1]. At the start of the UN peacekeeping budget cycle in July 2025, UN operations faced a shortfall of US$2 billion, more than 35% of the total US$5.6 billion budget for the 2024–25 cycle [3, p. 3]. The pressure extends to the UN's core budget. In December 2025 the General Assembly approved a US$3.45 billion regular budget for 2026, reflecting the Secretary-General's UN80 proposal, which included a 15% reduction in financial resources and a nearly 19% cut in staffing. The UN Controller said that 2,900 positions would be abolished from 1 January 2026 [4]. The regular budget is separate from the peacekeeping budget, which runs from July to June [4].

Political agreement is also harder to reach. On 28 August 2025 the UN Security Council voted to close the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after a final renewal. During the negotiations the United States had pushed for the mission to be terminated and fully withdrawn by 31 August 2026, while other Council members argued that any transition should be tied to conditions on the ground. SIPRI describes the 16-month extension as a relative compromise [3, pp. 3–4].

4. New models, and their limits

Two new operations were launched in 2025: the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) in Haiti [3, p. 1]. AUSSOM took over from the AU Transition Mission in Somalia, which closed at the end of 2024 [3, p. 4]. Four operations closed during the year: the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti, the Southern African Development Community mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq [3, pp. 1–2], and the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office's personal representative on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict [3, p. 8].

SIPRI suggests the GSF may provide "the most palatable—if not necessarily the most effective—mission model in the current geopolitical environment": mandated by the Security Council, staffed by an ad hoc coalition, funded by donors and supported by a UN Support Office [3, p. 11]. More broadly, it reports that "in the absence of multilateral responses to new and ongoing conflicts, the trend towards conflict management by ad hoc, often militarized bilateral or mini-lateral interventions continued in 2025" [3, p. 1].

5. Analysis

Set side by side, the datasets describe a widening gap. Interstate conflict is at its highest level in records going back to 1946, while peace-operation personnel are at their lowest December level since at least 2000. Three points stand out.

First, the conflicts that are growing are among the hardest for peace operations to address. Several of the 2025 interstate conflicts involve states with significant military power. In Meridian's assessment, such wars are unlikely to receive a multilateral deployment while the Security Council is divided.

Second, the civilian toll is concentrated where capacity is thinning. UCDP's sharpest increase was in one-sided violence, driven mainly by Sudan [1], and SIPRI reports that sub-Saharan Africa saw the biggest personnel cuts in 2025 [3, p. 1].

Third, demand for peace operations has not disappeared. SIPRI notes that the May 2025 Berlin Peacekeeping Ministerial indicated many UN member states remain strong supporters of UN peace operations, and that ceasefire and peace agreements continue to require deployments, for example the International Stabilization Force for Gaza, which the Security Council authorised but which had deployed no personnel by 31 December 2025 [3, pp. 8, 11]. Support exists in principle. What is missing is predictable funding.

6. Policy considerations

• Predictable financing. SIPRI attributes the 2025 cuts largely to delayed or unpaid contributions [3, p. 1]. Timely payment of assessed contributions is the cheapest available reform.
• Mandates matched to means. With the regular budget reduced by 15% [4] and peacekeeping already cut, mandates that promise more than resources allow risk discrediting the instrument.
• Standards for ad hoc arrangements. If ad hoc and bilateral interventions are becoming the norm [3, p. 1], states that rely on them have an interest in agreeing minimum standards on civilian protection and accountability.
• Watch the 2026 transitions. UNIFIL's final mandate expires in 2026 [3, pp. 3–4]. How that drawdown is managed will be an early test of whether exits can be orderly.

7. Conclusion

The international system is producing more wars between states while investing less in the tools designed to contain them. The data do not show that peace operations cause peace or that their decline causes war. They do show a growing mismatch between need and capacity. Unless states pair their stated support for multilateral conflict management with funding and political agreement, that gap is likely to widen.

References

1. Davies, S., Pettersson, T. and Öberg, M., 'Organized violence 1989–2025, and violent political protests', Journal of Peace Research, 63(4), 2026, pp. 705–723 (abstract and section 'Organized violence 1989–2025'). https://doi.org/10.1093/jopres/xjag046 (accessed 25 October 2026).
2. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, version 26.1 (UcdpPrioConflict_v26_1.csv; fields year, type_of_conflict, intensity_level). https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ (accessed 25 October 2026).
3. Pfeifer Cruz, C. and van der Lijn, J., Developments and Trends in Multilateral Peace Operations, 2025, SIPRI Fact Sheet, May 2026. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-05/fs_2605_mpo_2026.pdf (accessed 25 October 2026).
4. UN News (Vibhu Mishra), 'General Assembly approves $3.45 billion UN regular budget for 2026', 30 December 2025. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/12/1166685 (accessed 25 October 2026).
5. Uppsala University, 'UCDP Definitions'. https://www.uu.se/en/department/peace-and-conflict-research/research/ucdp/ucdp-definitions/ (accessed 25 October 2026).
6. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (conflict level), version 26.1 (BattleDeaths_v26_1_conf.csv, bd_best, year 2025). https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ (accessed 25 October 2026).
7. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset, version 26.1 (NonState_v26_1.csv, best_fatality_estimate, year 2025). https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ (accessed 25 October 2026).